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ABSTRACT 
The dramatic political and economic events, both globally and within the United 
States, during the early 1990s led to significant changes to the Navy shipyard 
organizational structure. As part of the Navy maintenance regionalization and 
consolidation program, the financial management system used to manage these 
commands has been changed. Specifically, the Navy has shifted two of its four shipyards, 
with authorization to shift the other two in fiscal year 2007, from the Navy Working 
Capital Fund to mission funding through direct congressional appropriations.  
This funding shift has raised questions about the advantages and disadvantages 
each financial system provides shipyards, the operating differences that occur due to the 
funding change, and the future financial consequences of funding Navy shipyards using 
direct appropriations. 
This thesis identifies the advantages and disadvantages of the Navy Working 
Capital Fund and the mission funding model in the context of a Navy shipyard 
environment and determines whether the change in financial structure provides an overall 
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The rapid change in the national defense environment during the early 1990s, a 
function of the collapse of the Soviet Union, resulted in widespread initiatives designed 
to improve the efficiency and cost effectiveness of the Department of Defense (DoD). 
One target of this initiative has been the Navy’s shipyard maintenance structure.  
In 1994, the Chief of Naval Operations introduced the Regional Maintenance Plan 
(RMP) for Navy shipyards, a consolidation of facilities aimed at reducing excess 
infrastructure, improving maintenance processes, and combining supply and maintenance 
functions across all levels of maintenance (GAO 1997, p.5). A byproduct of this 
regionalization effort has been the consolidation of the financial management systems 
used to govern these commands. Specifically, the Navy has shifted two of its four 
shipyards from a working capital method of funding to a more direct mission funding 
platform, and plans to restructure all of its shipyards in this fashion in the near future. 
This change has raised questions about the advantages and disadvantages each 
funding structure provides the shipyard, the operating differences that occur due to 
funding changes, and the future financial consequences of mission funding. 
This thesis will identify the advantages and disadvantages of the Navy Working 
Capital Fund (NWCF) and the Mission Funding (MF) model for Navy shipyards and 
determine whether the change in financial structure provides an overall benefit that 
should be pursued for all shipyards. 
 
A. OBJECTIVES 
This thesis examines the differences between the Navy Working Capital Fund and 
Mission Funding within the Navy shipyard maintenance environment. The goal of this 
work is to determine how these two funding methods constrain shipyard managers, as 
well as the aspects of each method that provide shipyard managers with opportunities 




The purpose of this research is to: 
• Describe the reasons behind the Navy’s shipyard restructuring plans. 
• Explain the operations of both funding methods. 
• Identify the inherent differences between both funding methods and show 
how these differences manifest themselves in Navy shipyard operations. 
• Suggest which funding method best serves the Navy shipyards. 
 
C. METHODOLOGY 
In researching this topic, the following were conducted: 
• A literature review of the historical background and basis behind the 
Navy’s decision to regionalize and consolidate its shipyards, as well as the 
decision to favor Mission Funding over the Navy Working Capital Fund. 
• Research into the Navy’s maintenance organizational structure and 
processes. 
• A literature review of the Federal budget process, from the perspective of 
the Navy, the Department of Defense and Congress. Additionally, a 
review of the budget execution process for Navy shipyards under each 
funding model was conducted. 
• A review of government reports from the Congressional Budget Office, 
the Congressional Research Service, the General Accountability Office, 
The Center for Naval Analysis, the DoD Comptroller and the DoD 
Inspector General was conducted during the progress of this research. 
Additionally, DoD directives and DoD and DoN Financial Management 
Circulars and instructions were perused, as was the GAO Red Book for 
authorities on Fiscal Law and procedures. Standard sources on 
governmental accounting and periodical literature were consulted, 
including publications of the U. S. Naval Institute. 
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• A study of the performance and cost reporting requirements for 
organizations under each funding method and the information contained 
therein. 
• Personal interviews with Navy Material and Logistics Offices (N4) at 
COMSUBPAC and COMSUBLANT were conducted to verify processes 
and identify how each funding method affects everyday operations, 
including numerous follow-up phone conversations.  
 
D. ORGANIZATION 
This thesis is organized in the following manner: 
• Chapter I is the Introduction. 
• Chapter II describes the Navy maintenance processes and the factors that 
led to the change in the Navy shipyard maintenance organizational 
structure. 
• Chapter III describes Mission Funding regulations, budgeting and 
execution, restrictions and shipyard operation under this model. 
• Chapter IV describes the Navy Working Capital Fund and its regulations, 
budgeting and execution, restrictions and shipyard operation under this 
model. 
• Chapter V compares the two funding methods in the context of Navy 
shipyard operations. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
There is wide variety of subject matter to absorb before the issues concerning a 
depot maintenance funding shift can be appreciated. This chapter provides an explanation 
of the Navy’s maintenance organization, creating a foundation to apply to the structural 
changes that have taken place within the realm of shipyard maintenance. Second, this 
chapter describes the political inertia behind the changes this thesis examines and 
provides an introduction to the Department of Defense and Navy policies that govern 
how their shipyards were reorganized in the face of this transformation. 
 
A. DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION 
The Navy’s maintenance program defines and manages the required configuration 
of each class of ship, along with the material condition of each individual ship. This 
program encompasses servicing, repair, modification, modernization, overhaul, 
conversion, rebuild, test, reclamation inspection and the determination of material 
condition. Its purpose is threefold: To maintain the highest achievable level of material 
readiness while supporting the ship’s mission and sustaining operational availability, to 
maintain ships in a safe material condition, and to meet the highest possible shipboard 
habitability standards possible for its sailors (OPNAVINST 4700.7K 2003, p.4). 
Maintenance procedures and schedules for Navy ships and related equipment are 
developed and performed using a methodology the Navy refers to as Condition-Based 
Maintenance (CBM). CBM attempts to balance operational readiness, safety, and 
equipment reliability with cost effectiveness, by conducting maintenance only when there 
is objective evidence of actual or predictable failure of a ship’s installed systems or 
components. It relies on the principles of Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) to 
obtain this balance (OPNAVINST 4700.7K 2003, p.5). 
Reliability-Centered Maintenance identifies maintenance tasks that are both 
applicable and effective in maintaining the inherent reliability of systems or equipment at 
an optimal cost. RCM principles determine what constitutes objective evidence of need 
for maintenance, while also ensuring that a maintenance task is both applicable to the 
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need and effective in restoring the system. RCM-applicable methodology identifies the 
maintenance tasks that are able to maintain or restore system or equipment reliability. 
RCM-effective methodology optimizes variables such as system or equipment failure 
consequences, safety of personnel, environmental impact, mission capability hindrance, 
and minimal life cycle cost to ensure that maintenance tasks “pay for themselves” 
(OPNAVINST 4700.7K 2003, Encl 7, p.7). 
 
1. Maintenance Echelons 
As one would expect for systems and equipment as sophisticated and physically 
imposing as a Navy vessel, the maintenance performed to ensure mission capability 
consists of actions as simple as visual inspections and minor testing, as well as covering 
such manpower and equipment intensive evolutions as nuclear refueling. To ensure all 
work is performed at locations, and by personnel, best suited for proper accomplishment, 
OPNAV Instruction 4700.7K separates ship maintenance into three echelons: 
organizational, intermediate, and depot level. Each respective level provides a greater 
degree of capability. It is the policy of the Navy to ensure all maintenance is done at the 
correct echelon by qualified personnel. 
 
a. Organizational-Level Maintenance  
Organizational-level maintenance represents the lowest echelon and 
consists of all preventative and corrective maintenance actions within the capacity of 
each individual ship’s operational forces. Each ship is expected to be self-sufficient to the 
maximum extent possible, fostering a “do it yourself” attitude and maximizing the 
mission capability of each ship (OPNAVINST 4700.7K 2003, p.8). 
Typical organizational-level maintenance actions include: 
• Facilities maintenance, such as cleaning and preservation. 
• Routine systems and component preventive maintenance, such as 
inspections, systems operability tests and diagnostics, lubrication, 
calibration, and cleaning. 
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• Corrective maintenance, such as hull, mechanical, electrical, and 
electronic troubleshooting down to the lowest replaceable unit level, 
miniature and micro-miniature (2M) electronic repair, and  minor repairs 
to components to restore operation. 
• Assistance to higher level maintenance activities. 
• Verification and quality assurance of maintenance accomplished  by 
other activities. 
• Documentation of all deferred and completed maintenance actions, 
whether accomplished by ship's force or by other activities (OPNAVINST 
4700.7K 2003, Encl 1, p.1). 
 
b. Intermediate-Level Maintenance  
Intermediate-level maintenance requires a higher skill, capability or 
capacity than can be supported by ship’s force on an organizational level. Intermediate-
level work includes the following: 
• Preventive maintenance. 
• Corrective maintenance. 
• Tests and inspections. 
• Provision of services such as electrical power, water, gas and air 
replenishment, and tool issue. 
• Installation of alterations. 
• Work on electronic miniature/ micro-miniature printed circuit boards, 
components, modules, subassemblies, and other equipment coded for 
intermediate-level repair. 
• Calibration and repair services for electrical and electronic test and 
monitoring equipment; pressure, vacuum, and temperature  measuring 
devices; and mechanical measuring instruments. 
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• Technical assistance to ship's force in diagnosing system or equipment 
problems and assistance in repairs, as necessary. 
• Assistance in the emergency repair and manufacture of unavailable 
replacement parts or assemblies (OPNAVINST 4700.7K 2003, Encl 2, 
p.1). 
 
This maintenance is performed primarily by Navy Fleet Maintenance 
Activity (FMA) personnel, and can be accomplished at Intermediate Maintenance 
Facilities (IMF), Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activities (SIMA), Trident Refit 
Facilities (TRF), tenders, repair ships, aircraft carriers and Fleet support bases. These 
facilities are equipped with space, machinery and diagnostic equipment not available to 
ship’s force. Intermediate maintenance is conducted during upkeep periods, known as 
availabilities, which typically span about one month in duration. (Ibid) 
 
c. Depot-Level Maintenance 
Depot-level maintenance exceeds the capabilities of both organizational- 
and intermediate-level activities. It typically takes much longer, often twelve months or 
more, than intermediate availabilities. Activities performed at the Depot-level include: 
• Preventative maintenance. 
• Corrective maintenance. 
• Test and inspections. 
• Provision of services such as electrical power, water, gas and air 
replenishment, and tool issue. 
• Installation of alterations. 
• Modernization, conversion, overhaul, and reclamation or rebuild of parts, 
assemblies, sub-assemblies, components, equipment and weapons 
systems. 
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• Manufacture of critical non-available parts. 
• Providing technical assistance to IMAs (OPNAVINST 3120.32C 1994, 
Encl 1, p.9-8). 
 
This maintenance is typically conducted in fixed shore facilities, Navy 
shipyards (NSY), private shipyards and by depot field teams. There are four NSYs 
designated for depot-level maintenance: Norfolk Naval Shipyard (NNS) and Portsmouth 
Naval Shipyard (PNS) which serve the Atlantic Fleet, and Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard 
(PHNS) and Puget Sound Naval Shipyard (PSNS) which serve the Pacific Fleet. 
Additionally, six private shipyards also provide depot-level capability, as well as 
performing all new ship construction: Avondale Operation (New Orleans, Louisiana), 
Ingalls Operation (Gulfport, Mississippi), Newport News Shipyard (Newport News, 
Virginia), Bath Iron Works (Bath, Maine), Electric Boat (Groton, Connecticut) and the 
National Steel and Shipbuilding Company (San Diego, California). Avondale, Ingalls and 
Newport News are owned by Northrup Grumman Ship Systems, while Bath Iron Works, 
Electric Boat and the National Steel and Shipbuilding Company are owned by General 
Dynamics. 
 
2. Maintenance Policy and Procedures 
The Navy requires each class of ship to adhere to its own specific maintenance 
program. Each program delineates all preventive maintenance actions for all maintenance 
echelons, including their required periodicities. To improve the readiness capability of 
each ship, each maintenance program also coordinates evolutions requiring significant 
time in port, such as depot-level availabilities, with the ships’ Inter-Deployment Training 
Cycle (IDTC) schedule. It includes the required frequency of intermediate–level 
availabilities, as well as any special maintenance, maintenance support, or infrastructure 
requirements. Each program is approved through the applicable CNO Ship’s Resource 
Sponsor for that class of ship, and is developed and executed by the Naval Sea Systems 
Command (NAVSEASYSCOM)  (OPNAVINST 4700.7K 2003, p.7). 
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The management of maintenance and maintenance support is governed by the 
Navy Ships’ Maintenance and Material Management System (3-M). The 3-M System 
provides managers with the ability to access standardized data to aid in planning and 
controlling manpower and resources requirements in conducting preventative and 
corrective maintenance, as well as a channel to provide feedback and evaluation of 
procedures and resource requirements. It is designed to optimize the performance of 
current and future maintenance efforts by requiring uniform maintenance standards and 
criteria, documenting and analyzing maintenance and maintenance support actions, and 
providing a means to schedule, plan, manage and track maintenance actions. To further 
improve efficiency in accurately maintaining the status of all ships, the 3-M System is 
separated into two categories, preventative maintenance and corrective maintenance 
(OPNAVINST 4790.4D 2004, p.2). 
 
a. Preventative Maintenance 
Preventive maintenance actions are defined as those actions intended to 
prevent or discover functional failures (OPNAVINST 4700.7K 2003, Encl 7, p.7). These 
maintenance items are designed to prevent costly corrective repairs by preemptively 
performing minor tests and inspections designed to restore optimal operation and to 
discover parts in need of replacement prior to failure. Preventative maintenance is 
controlled by the Planned Maintenance System (PMS), a subset of the 3-M System that 
provides a standard means for planning, scheduling, controlling, and performing planned 
maintenance on all equipment (OPNAVINST 3120.32C 1994, Encl 1 p.9-3). The PMS 
System is divided into two levels, organizational and intermediate/ depot-level.  
(1)  Organizational Level Preventative Maintenance. All non-
nuclear1 organizational-level PMS actions are contained on Maintenance Requirement 
Cards (MRC). MRCs provide detailed procedures for how preventive maintenance is to 
be conducted, as well as information regarding resource requirements, man-hours 
expected, and the periodicity for each action. Once an organization completes a PMS 
                                                 
1 All nuclear preventative maintenance is governed by NAVSEAINST C9210.30A, Nuclear Reactor 
Plant Preventive Maintenance and Tender Nuclear Support Facilities Preventive Maintenance on Ships. 
This program is similar to the PMS system, and differences are insignificant in the context of this thesis. 
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item according to the MRC, it is documented on a Maintenance Index Page (MIP). MIPs 
are maintained onboard the ship as a reference for verification that all required 
maintenance has been completed, as well a reminder of maintenance that is due but has 
been deferred and remains outstanding (OPNAVINST 4700.7K 2003, Encl 4 p.2). 
 
(2)  Intermediate- / Depot-Level Preventative Maintenance The 
maintenance process is the same for shipboard preventative maintenance performed by 
intermediate or depot level organizations, however the documentation is slightly 
different. Intermediate and depot level organizations utilize the Maintenance Resource 
Management System (MRMS) instead of the PMS System. Detailed maintenance 
descriptions, resource requirements and periodicities are maintained within the Master 
Job Catalog (MJC) as MJC items. MJC item completion and outstanding maintenance are 
also maintained within the MJC (Ibid).  
 
b. Corrective Maintenance 
Corrective maintenance consists of actions intended to return or restore 
equipment to acceptable performance levels. Decisions made about corrective 
maintenance actions are made in accordance with the RCM principles described 
previously, in an attempt to optimize reliability and cost considerations. The decision to 
perform corrective maintenance is based solely on equipment condition (OPNAVINST 
4700.7K 2003, p.6). 
The subset of the 3-M System used to manage shipboard corrective 
maintenance is the Maintenance Data System (MDS). This system allows personnel 
onboard each ship, at any time, to input any changes to the status of their equipment. 
Whenever an item is determined to need corrective maintenance, shipboard personnel 
designate a Job Control Number (JCN) for identification, along with a description of the 
problem, parts required to fix the problem, any accompanying technical data, priority and 
availability type required to complete the maintenance (depot, intermediate, additional 
technical assistance, organizational).  
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The compilation of all JCNs, and their accompanying data, is known as 
the Current Ship’s Maintenance Plan (CSMP). These data can be easily transmitted from 
the ship to its shore-based command, where further review of the problem and final 
approval of the corrective action takes place. Work packages are created and 
intermediate- and depot-level availabilities are coordinated around the contents of the 
ship’s CSMP. A current, accurate CSMP provides the gauge for each ship’s material 
condition (Ibid). 
 
B. NAVY MAINTENANCE CHANGE 
The change in the funding structure for Navy shipyard depots to be examined by 
this thesis was a byproduct of a larger decision to streamline the maintenance process and 
to reduce the shipyard infrastructure, thus improving the efficiency and effectiveness of 
shipyard operations. The driving force behind this decision was the end of the Cold War, 
which caused a paradigm shift in how the nation prepared for war and how the nation’s 
resources would be allocated to support national defense. 
The U.S. military policy during the Cold war resulted in tremendous capability, 
and as a byproduct, infrastructure to support its forces afloat. A lynchpin of President 
Reagan’s strategy was the creation of a 600 ship Navy. In 1987, the Navy had reached 
568 ships (O’Rourke 2002, p.2). 
The prevailing view of the country’s strategic capability requirements began to 
shift beginning with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of Communism 
throughout Eastern Europe in 1989. Then in 1990, the idea of a new type of war against a 
regional threat manifested itself when Iraq invaded Kuwait. This new war was not against 
an ideological superpower, but rather against rogue leaders aimed toward regional 
domination and in pursuit of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. How Desert 
Storm was fought began a dramatic change in how our forces were structured (Aspen 
1993). By 1991, the Navy ship inventory had dropped to 526, with planning estimates 
placing the 1995 number at 451 (GAO 1992, p.3). 
In 1992, the National Military Strategy of the United States officially shifted the 
focus from containing the spread of Communism and deterring Soviet aggression to a 
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more flexible, regionally oriented strategy. This change aimed to allow the United States 
the opportunity to meet threats at lower costs, without a large mobilization of forces 
(GAO 1992, p.20). Immediately upon entering office, President Clinton began the Bottom 
Up Review. The goal of this study was to identify how the changes in the military should 
affect force structure, modernization and infrastructure. It also identified the lack of a 
strong economy as an economic danger to national security. Subsequent to the release of 
the report on the Bottom Up Review, President Clinton proposed a $60 billion cut to the 
Defense budget over the next six years in an effort to reduce the 1992 $425 billion 
operating deficit (Larson, et al. 2001, p.41-44). 
In addition to essentially halting shipbuilding, the country’s ship support 
infrastructure was quickly identified as an area that could be significantly reduced. In 
1992, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Depot Consolidation Study estimated a 25-50% excess 
capacity within the depot maintenance system. Subsequent testimony before the Armed 
Forces congressional committee found the JCS study to be conservative (GAO 1993, 
p.1). During the 1991, 1993 and 1995 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 
Commissions, the number of depot-level shipyards was cut in half, eliminating shipyards 
in Philadelphia, Pa., Long Beach, Ca., Mare Island, Ca., and Charleston, SC. The Subic 
Bay, Philippines facility was also closed, leaving only two remaining overseas ship repair 
facilities. Without the Navy’s shipbuilding business, the private sector was forced to 
make significant changes in its operations as well. Fourteen private shipyards possessed 
the capability to construct warships in 1990. By 2003, there were only six (Truver 2004). 
 
C. CHANGE IMPLEMENTATION 
Whereas increased cost effectiveness was the goal of the shipyard infrastructure 
reduction, an ever shrinking budget, even for the shipyards that remained in operation, 
necessitated a shift toward improved operational efficiency as well. In 1990, the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense (OSD) issued a memorandum titled, Strengthening Depot 
Maintenance Activities, which directed each Service to seek cost savings through 
improved efficiency of operations. Later that same year, OSD established the Defense 
Depot Maintenance Council (DDMC) to review DoD maintenance policies, systems, 
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programs and activities, to advise OSD on cost reduction initiatives within depot 
maintenance, and to provide a forum for maintenance commands to exchange 
information and ideas (DoD Directive 5128.32). 
Defense Management Report Decision (DMRD) 908, issued on 17 November 
1990, was the first product of the new council. In it, the council targeted savings of $3.9 
billion by FY 1995 through improved short- and long-term depot operations. The 
following year, the DDMC outlined how this would be accomplished in its Corporate 
Business Plan for FY 91-95. The council identified increased contract competitions, 
further closures, workload realignment and inter-Service transfers as the mechanism by 
which the savings could be achieved (Bachmann 1995, p.23). 
To meet the requirements established by the Department of Defense, the Chief of 
Naval Operations (CNO) developed a Regional Maintenance Plan (RMP). The objectives 
of the RMP were to: 
• Emphasize process improvement while maintaining customer 
responsiveness and Fleet readiness. 
• Eliminate excess infrastructure capacity and capability. 
• Better integrate supply support and maintenance requirements. 
• Provide management visibility of all maintenance-related costs. 
• Provide compatible Automatic Data Processing management across all 
levels of maintenance. 
• Preserve the requirement for positive technical control. 
• Reflect DoD and Navy Core Competencies Policy (CNO 1994). 
 
The CNO’s message also identified three phases for RMP implementation: 
• Phase One – Optimize intermediate-level interoperability by minimizing 
redundant capacity and capability through process improvements and 
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resource sharing, and develop prototype centers of excellence, called 
Regional Repair Centers. 
• Phase Two – Integrate intermediate- and depot-level activities and 
establish Regional Maintenance Centers (RMC), consisting of a 
confederation of Regional Repair Centers. 
• Phase Three – Conduct Fleet maintenance using single maintenance 
process supported by common business and production practices. (Ibid) 
 
The RMP began to come to fruition in 1995, when the Pearl Harbor Shore 
Intermediate Maintenance Activity consolidated with the Submarine Base Pearl Harbor 
Intermediate Maintenance Activity, and later with a similar consolidation of the two 
Puget Sound intermediate maintenance facilities. As part of these consolidations, the 
Navy’s funding mechanism for its shipyards shifted from the NWCF to that of mission 
funding. Chapters III and IV describe in detail the workings of these two financing 
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III. MISSION FUNDING 
Mission funding is the term commonly used to describe the process of financing 
all aspects of a Navy maintenance organization through a direct congressional 
appropriation. This is the process used to fund the IMFs at the Pearl Harbor and Puget 
Sound shipyards, as well as the process chosen to fund the entire shipyards once depot 
and intermediate-level maintenance were combined under a single command. This 
chapter describes the mission funding process, as well as its evolution and its impact on 
Navy shipyards. It will also explain the intricacies of mission funded programs, to allow a 
comparison with working capital funds (described in Chapter IV). 
 
A. ORIGINS OF DIRECT APPROPRIATIONS 
All forms of government spending originate with a legislative appropriation. This 
responsibility is articulated in Article 1, Section 9 of the Constitution:  
No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of 
Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the 
Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from 
time to time. 
The scope of this responsibility has changed dramatically since the penning of the 
Constitution. Whereas early Congresses had no formal budget and were able to disperse 
appropriations as individual line items, the growth of the country, both physically and 
politically, has added significant complexity to the process of spending money.  
The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 established the framework for the 
current budget process. This act gave the President the responsibility of establishing 
central oversight for the nation’s spending priorities, requiring the President to submit a 
consolidated budget request to the Congress each February. In addition, this act created 
two government agencies to assist in the budget process: the Bureau of the Budget 
(restructured in 1970 as the Office of Management and Budget [OMB]) was formed to 
assist the President in this responsibility, and the General Accounting Office (now 
Government Accountability Office [GAO]) was created to assist Congress as the 
principle auditing agency of the federal government (Saturno 1996). 
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In 1974, the budget process evolved further with the passage of the Congressional 
Budget and Impoundment Control Act. This legislation created the House and Senate 
budget committees and provided for an annual concurrent budget resolution between the 
two houses as a mechanism for facilitating a joint budgetary decision. This Act also 
established the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to support the budget committees 
with independent budgetary information and expertise (Ibid). The combined result of 
these two pieces of legislation essentially codified how the process works today. 
 
B. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET PROCESS 
Once the President has submitted his budget request, the House and Senate budget 
committees hold hearings with analysts, staff, industry and the President’s administration 
to better understand the proposal. The budget committees then submit their budgetary 
estimates and overall opinion of how the budget should be constructed in a report, known 
as a resolution, to be debated within their respective house of Congress.  
After the entire House and Senate have had the chance to voice their opinions and 
provide feedback to their respective budget committee, a budget resolution is drafted. 
House and Senate conference committees then meet to resolve any differences, which 
results in a composite budget resolution. This resolution is then returned to both houses 
for an up or down vote. Upon being passed by both houses of Congress, this concurrent 
resolution then establishes a ceiling for the respective appropriations committees in 
structuring their appropriations. Although the resolution is not law, it acts as an internal 
control for the rest of the budget process and can be enforced by a member of Congress if 
attempted to be breached (Tyszkiewicz and Daggett 1998, p.31-32). The concurrent 








050 - National Defense 550 - Health 
150 - International Affairs 570 - Medicare 
250 - Space and Science 600 - Income Security 
270 - Energy 650 - Social Security 
300 - Natural Resources and Environment 700 - Veteran's Benefits 
350 - Agriculture 750 - Justice 
370 - Commerce and Housing Credit 800 - General Government 
400 - Transportation 900 - Net Interest 
450 - Community Development 920 - Allowances 
500 - Education, Training, Employment 950 - Undistributed Offsetting Receipts 
Figure 1.   Congressional Budget Functions  
     (From Author) 
 
1. Authorization and Appropriation 
National Defense spending authority is typically granted by Congress through two 
acts: The Defense Authorization Act and the Defense Appropriations Act. The 
Authorization Act is used to set policy and authorize programs. This act provides the 
legal authority for DoD to create, continue, change or abolish programs, activities and 
entire agencies, as well as setting the conditions under which these functions can operate 
(Ibid, p.34). The House and Senate Armed Services committees maintain jurisdiction 
over the Defense Authorization Act, including the portion of the Defense Appropriation 
to be allocated to Navy shipyard maintenance. The process of creating the Defense 
Authorization Act is similar to the budget resolution process, except it is signed into law. 
While the Authorization Act, in addition to determining which programs will be 
executed, may also recommend spending levels for programs and activities, the sole 
purpose of the Defense Appropriations Act is to provide funding for the authorized 
agencies, programs, and activities. The annual appropriations process provides funding 
for discretionary2 programs through eleven appropriations acts covering the budget 
functions identified in Figure 1. The congressional appropriations process is similar to 
that of the budget resolution and the authorization process. Both, the Defense 
                                                 
2 There are two types of government spending, Discretionary and Mandatory. Discretionary spending 
requires an annual spending bill for its continued funding; whereas mandatory spending is spending that 
has been provided for by permanent law (e.g. Social Security and Medicare) and requires no additional 
legislation for its continued existence 
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Authorization Act and the Defense Appropriations Act, are passed in both houses of 
Congress and are signed into law by the President. 
 
2. Congressional Appropriations Subdivisions 
Congressional appropriations for the Department of Defense are divided into 
seven major subdivisions, each specifically appropriated for the individual Services. The 
following shows these subdivisions and the major activities the Navy funds under each: 
• Military Personnel (MPN) – Includes pay and allowances for officers, 
enlisted personnel and midshipmen, enlisted personnel subsistence, 
permanent change of duty station travel and other personnel costs. 
• Operations and Maintenance (OMN) – Includes maintenance for 
operational forces, mobilization, training, recruiting, administration and 
service wide support. 
• Procurement – Includes Aircraft (APN), Weapons (WPN), Shipbuilding 
and Conversion (SCN), Other (OPN) and ammunition procurement. 
• Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) – Includes basic 
and applied research, technology development, demonstration and 
validation, engineering and manufacturing, RDT&E management support 
and operational systems development. 
• Revolving and Management Funds – Includes Supply Management, Depot 
Maintenance, Naval Warfare Centers, Naval Research Laboratory, 
Transportation, Public Work Centers and Naval Facilities Engineering 
Commands. 
• Other Defense Programs – Includes health care for Navy personnel. 
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• Military Construction3 (MCN) – Includes major and minor construction, 
planning and support activities, and historical projects (Candreva 2005, 
p.75, DoD Appropriations Act 2006). 
An example of the language of an appropriation can be seen in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2.   2006 Defense Appropriations Act Language  
 (From DoD Appropriations Act 2006) 
 
C. DEFENSE BUDGET PREPARATION 
The creation of a budget request for submittal to the President is part of the 
biennial4 Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) System. The entire 
process is utilized by DoD to convert the President’s National Security Strategy into the 
programs required to support that strategy and the budget plan to execute those programs. 
The Planning phase produces the documents that provide strategic military guidance 
which support the President’s policies. The Programming phase defines the hardware, 
manpower, training, support and other needs that will best carry out this strategic 
guidance. The output of the Programming phase is the Program Objectives Memorandum 
(POM). This document is a six year resource allocation plan that serves as the backbone 
of the budget process (Candreva 2005, p.35). 
 
                                                 
3 Military Construction is a congress appropriation of its own. All other appropriations are found in the 
language of the Defense Appropriations Act. 
4 Although Congress requires a Presidential budget request annually, the PPBE process is a biennial 
process. In off-years, Program Reviews are conducted to incorporate any fact-of-life changes. Services can 
request off-year changes to DoD via Program Change Proposals or Budget Change Proposals. 
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Budgets are built from the ground up at the Service level. The process begins at 
the cost center level. A cost center is one of any number of departments within an 
organization. It identifies its costs and provides this input to its organization’s Fund 
Administrating Activity (FAA). 
The FAA is responsible for the management of its cost centers’ resources.  FAAs 
evaluate and incorporate their unit’s budget requests into a consolidated organizational 
budget request to submit to their assigned Type Commander, the next step in the Navy’s 
operational command structure.  
The budget is reviewed and refined as it is forwarded up the chain of command, to 
the Budget Submitting Office (BSO), where all of a BSO’s subordinate budget requests 
are consolidated into one Budget Estimate Submission (BES). This BES is then 
forwarded to the Navy Office of Budget (FMB) where it is incorporated with all other 
Navy BES’s into one consolidated budget request. It is approved by the Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management & Comptroller), as well as the Secretary of 
the Navy (SECNAV). Once the Navy completes its review, the budget request is sent to 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), where it undergoes another review and is 
consolidated with the budgets of the other Services, becoming the DoD budget request. 
Finally, the DoD budget request is sent to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
and is incorporated into the President’s budget (Ibid, p.49-54). Figure 3 provides an 
example of the budget submission process for the mission funded Pearl Harbor Naval 
Shipyard & Intermediate Maintenance Facility (PHNS & IMF). 
Important to note about how the Navy prepares its budget is that, while its cost 
centers provide ground level, accurate cost information, their budgets do not include the 
entire cost of their organizations. In the same way Congress separates its defense 
appropriation into subdivisions, the Navy also divides the responsibility for building its 
budget. For example, a large portion of the government’s cost at PHNS & IMF is its 
military personnel. However, this cost is not included in its budget request. Instead, 
military personnel costs are budgeted on a Navy-wide level, by the BSOs that manage the 
Navy’s personnel, such as the Naval Education and Training Command (NETC), the 
Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED) and the Naval Personnel Command (NPC). 
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Similarly, regardless of where a building is constructed, all Navy construction is 
budgeted by the Naval Engineering Facilities Command (NAVFAC) and the Naval 




Figure 3.   DoD Budget Preparation Process for PHNS & NIMF 
     (From Author) 
Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard / 
 Navy Intermediate Maintenance Facility 
(Organizational FAA’s) 
 
- Reviews cost center budget requests. 
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D. DIRECT APPROPRIATION RESTRICTIONS 
When the Defense Appropriations Act is signed into law by the President, the 
contents of the act represent obligational authority in the amounts appropriated. 
Obligational authority is the ability to enter into an agreement which will require the 
government to make a payment, now or sometime in the future. For example, Figure 2 
shows obligational authority for the Navy to spend $29,995,383,000 in government 
money for OMN expenses. Congress does not issue this money to the Navy, but does 
allow the Navy to incur expenses of this amount to be paid by the U.S. Treasury.  
The obligational authority Congress grants the Navy is accompanied by rules 
regarding its execution, specifically: the purpose of the expenditure, the time period in 
which it is incurred and the amount available for obligation.  
 
1. Purpose Restrictions 
The purpose of an appropriation can be as specific as a line item within the 
Appropriations or Authorization Act. It can also be as broad as a lump sum amount for a 
category like OMN. Two requirements must be met to ensure money is being obligated 
for its designated purpose: 
• If the purpose is included in the BES and is not otherwise prohibited by 
law, it is legally available even if it is not specifically mentioned in an 
appropriation. 
• Likewise, if an item is otherwise prohibited by law, even if it is included 
in the BES and appropriations are made available without mentioning the 
item, the appropriation is not available to be obligated for that item. 
To avoid requiring every minor expenditure item to be included in the BES, 
agencies are given discretion concerning the purpose of their obligations under the 
Necessary Expense Doctrine. If an expenditure is logically related to an appropriation, is 
not prohibited by law and is not covered under a separate appropriation, it can legally be 
obligated (Candreva 2005, p.73-74). 
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2. Time Period Restrictions 
When Congress appropriates funds for the execution of a program, it is not just 
permission, it is a legal requirement. As such, appropriated funds are made available for a 
set duration of time to ensure their timely execution and to prevent a stockpiling of 
available funds by executive agencies.  
The first period of time in the life of an appropriation is the obligation availability 
period. For the duration of this period, funds are available to incur obligations. In other 
words, the agencies who receive these appropriations may enter into contracts that will 
require the payment of their allotted funds. This period varies for different appropriation 
types. For example, due to the long term nature of a procurement account, they have three 
to five year obligation availabilities, and are termed three (five) year accounts. OMN 
accounts are one year accounts, which makes sense given the shorter time horizon in 
funding periodic maintenance as well as the need to annually revisit the cost of funding 
operational forces in light of changing world situations. Once the obligation availability 
period is over, the account is considered expired and no further contracts can be incurred 
under that appropriation (Ibid, p.72). 
An additional requirement of an obligation availability period is that all 
obligations must be used to meet a need that exists during that period. For example, if an 
agency finds itself with an excess of OMN funds at the end of the fiscal year5, it is not 
allowed to enter into a contract for a good or service that it does not currently need, but it 
anticipates it will need during the next fiscal year. This is referred to as the Bona Fide 
Needs Rule. Appropriations are available only to meet the bona fide needs of their 
respective obligation availability period (Ibid, p.77). 
The expiration of an appropriation’s obligation availability period does not mark 
the end of its life. Although contracts must be entered into during the obligation 
availability period to meet the needs arising in that period, the delivery of the goods and 
services contracted does not have to be crunched into that time as well. Immediately 
following the expiration of an obligation availability period begins an appropriation’s 
                                                 
5 All obligation periods coincide with the Federal fiscal year, from October 1 – September 30. For one 
year funds, the obligation availability period for that appropriation expires at the end of the fiscal year. 
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expenditure availability period. This period is five years in duration for all appropriation 
types, and during this period the obligations incurred in the obligation availability period 
are liquidated as the contracted goods and services are received (Ibid, p.72). 
The end of the expenditure availability period marks the end of an open 
appropriation. No further claims can be charged to its account and all outstanding 
obligations are cancelled. 
 
3. Obligation Amount Restrictions 
In addition to the congress restrictions placed on the use of funds and the periods 
in which they are to be obligated and expended, there are also fiscal restrictions placed on 
the amount of money available in an appropriation. The statute governing the over-
obligation of an appropriation is referred to as the Anti-Deficiency Act. Its first key 
provision disallows obligations or expenditures from exceeding the amount available in 
an appropriation. The second prevents the obligation of funds prior to an appropriation 
being written into law (Ibid, p.79-80). 
This may seem intuitively obvious, given the fact that a budget implies a 
limitation on funds available to spend. However, when accompanied with time and 
purpose restrictions, meeting this requirement can become tricky. If an obligation is 
initially incorrectly charged to one account, in the process of correcting accounting 
records it could be found that the correct account does not have the funds still available to 
cover the expense of the obligation. In this example, a problem in determining the proper 
purpose of an appropriation would result in the over-obligation of an appropriation, 
creating an Anti-Deficiency Act violation. Problems can also occur if an obligation is 
made and delivery occurs in a subsequent fiscal year, then it is determined that it was not 
a bona fide need of the fiscal year in which it was obligated. In this example, the correct 
funding would be from the next year’s appropriation. However, since there were no 
appropriations yet authorized for the following fiscal year, the contract would be in 
violation of the Anti-Deficiency Act, as it would have obligated funds prior to them being 
legally available. 
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The previous scenario also displays how budgetary limitations on how long funds 
are available for obligation can cause problems transitioning from one fiscal year to the 
next. While the congressional budget cycle attempts to write the next fiscal year’s 
Appropriations Acts prior to the end of the current fiscal year, often political differences 
lead to delays. This can cause a period of time for mission funded activities where the 
previous obligation availability period has expired, but no funds have been made 
available for new obligations. As has been shown, managers are not allowed to enter into 
contracts in the expectation of eventual funding. To combat this problem, Congress can 
pass what is called a Continuing Resolution Authority (CRA). CRAs authorize 
organizations to enter into new obligations at a designated spending rate until a new 
Appropriations Act has been passed. Under a CRA, only programs that have previously 
been authorized are allowed obligations. In other words, organizations are not allowed to 
circumvent congressional review by starting new programs during a CRA period.  
 
E. BUDGET EXECUTION FOR MISSION FUNDED ORGANIZATIONS 
Once the Defense Appropriations Act is signed into law by the President, the flow 
of funds follows a similar path as the budget request in the opposite direction. The 
treasury first opens accounts for each appropriation in order to allow proper tracking of 
the obligation made against them. It then passes this information to OMB in the form of 
treasury warrants. The challenge for OMB is to then spend the funds in their entirety, for 
the correct purpose, without overspending. To ensure deficiencies do not occur due to 
overspending an account, Federal law requires OMB to regulate spending by distributing 
funds in apportionments. In this format, spending authority is distributed incrementally, 
typically quarterly. The objective is to ensure organizations have the funds necessary to 
meet the full intent of the appropriation without running out of funds prior to the end of 
the fiscal year. 
OMB apportions funds to OSD, who then allocates funds to each Service. 
Services distribute funds amongst their Major Commands. These funds are also 
apportioned quarterly.  The Major Commands issue spending plans, called allowances or  
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Operating Targets (OPTAR), to their subordinate commands. These FAAs are then 
responsible for the execution of these plans according to their budget requests. This 
process is shown in Figure 4. 
 
F. INTERMEDIATE MAINTENANCE FACILITY OPERATIONS 
The two separate Intermediate Maintenance Facilities at Pearl Harbor operated as 
mission funded organizations under the Pacific Fleet Command (COMPACFLT) prior to 
the consolidation efforts at the PHNS. In submitting their budget proposals, the vast 
majority of their costs centered on OMN expenses, which covered the costs associated 
with maintaining their facilities, providing the materials and services necessary to support 
the submarines and surface vessels they maintained, and paid their civilian salaries. All 
military salaries were covered by the MILPERS budget requests, all new construction 
requests were covered by the MILCON appropriation, and any capital expenditures were 
submitted within various Procurement budget requests.  
As primarily OMN budgets, IMFs utilized one year funds allotted quarterly by 
their respective chain of command. Since the appropriations covering IMFs were paid for 
directly through congressional appropriations, the beneficiaries of IMF work received a 
free product. In other words, the applicable authorizations and appropriations designated 
that the funds provided were to be used to perform a certain amount of maintenance on 
ships under the supervision of the Pacific Fleet. COMPACFLT determined the 
maintenance schedules and priorities, and this maintenance was conducted to the 
maximum extent of their appropriations.  
The financial operation of a shipyard under the NWCF varies significantly to one 








Figure 4.   Mission Funding Budget Execution 
     (from Author) 
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IV. NAVY WORKING CAPITAL FUND 
Essentially all of the funding the Navy receives originates from the direct 
appropriations, or mission funding (MF), written to support its mission. A unique form of 
management used by specific organizations to execute this mission is the Defense 
Working Capital Fund (DWCF). The DWCF is a revolving fund, it finances its own 
operations by charging for the services it provides to the customers it supports. For the 
organizations that utilize this financial strategy, it creates a pseudo-entity, which attempts 
to adopt private business practices in meeting the needs of its customers. 
 
A. THE FORMATION OF THE DWCF 
The Navy has managed various forms of revolving funds since the 1800s, 
beginning with a General Account of Advances used to more effectively obtain and 
distribute inventoried supplies to its sailors. Revolving funds were formally recognized 
by Congress as part of the National Security Act Amendment of 1949. Prior to the formal 
establishment of a DWCF, the Navy, along with the other services, maintained separate 
revolving accounts in the form of stock funds and industrial funds. Stock funds managed 
the procurement and distribution of inventory items and industrial funds managed 
services and materials such as depot-level shipyard maintenance (Candreva 2005, p.91). 
The renewed focus on the country’s economic well-being, which spurred the 
defense changes discussed in Chapter II, also affected these revolving funds. In 1991, 
Congress established the Defense Business Operations Fund (DBOF) to bring a business 
approach to the operation of the Services’ revolving funds. The DBOF consolidated stock 
funds and industrial funds from each service into a central Department of Defense (DoD) 
level account. The purpose of the DBOF was to reduce the costs of operation for the 
revolving fund activities by establishing increased cost visibility, thus allowing managers 
to improve the quality of the products and services they provided, while also providing 
those services in the most efficient and effective manner. It also allowed the overall cash 
cushion to finance operations to be reduced, since the individual funds were now part of a 
larger pool. Included in the DBOF were transportation, supply management, finance and 
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accounting and depot maintenance accounts. As a result of the reduction in cash levels, 
problems arose in managing the cash flow for all the separate entities included in the 
fund. In FY96, DoD again restructured its revolving funds to better manage the cash flow 
within its account. It was divided into separate Defense Working Capital Funds (DWCF): 
Navy, Army, Air Force, Defense-Wide, Defense Commissary and Other Defense. In 
addition to easing the central DBOF’s cash flow management problems, this restructuring 
also returned the responsibility to effectively manage these funds to the Services. The 
current Navy Working Capital Fund (NWCF) is subdivided into five activity groups: 
supply management, research and development, transportation, base support and depot 
maintenance (OSD Comptroller iCenter). 
 
B. NWCF OBJECTIVES 
The NWCF is not a congressional funding method, but a financial management 
strategy for organizations that serve congressionally funded programs. Under mission 
funding, a maintenance depot is run directly by the Fleet it serves. In contrast, shipyards 
that operate under the NWCF are their own entities. In short, a working capital fund 
changes the flow of resources and decision making for the activity utilizing its financial 
structure. In the case of a Navy shipyard, without a working capital fund, the shipyard 
receives funding from the appropriations process via the Fleet Command it serves. 
Shipyard managers then provide maintenance to the Fleet at the level this funding can 
support. From the Fleet’s perspective, once it has allocated obligation authority to the 
shipyard, the maintenance it requests is prepaid. Under the NWCF, the funds from the 
appropriation process are provided directly to the Fleet. The shipyard and the Fleet then 
enter into a buyer/ seller relationship rather than a subordinate/ command relationship 
(See Figure 5). The shipyard determines the total cost of doing business, including direct 
costs, indirect costs, overhead and general and administrative expenses, and then bills the 







Figure 5.   MF vs. NWCF Organizational Relationships 
     (After: DOE 2003, p.4) 
 
The goal of a NWCF within an organization is to streamline operations and 
maximize resources. By establishing clear customer/provider relationships, adopting 
private-sector techniques for resource management, consolidating key functions, and 
using activity-based accounting policies to display full costs, NWCFs provide managers 
with the cost and performance data required to make effective and efficient decisions. Its 
total-cost awareness facilitates business-like processes and budget choices that are 
responsive, unbiased, and mission-driven (OSD Comptroller iCenter). The NWCF 
provides the following benefits: 
• Identifies the total cost of DoD goods and services to Congress, military 
users (buyers), and those who provide goods and services (sellers).  
• Promotes more efficient and effective allocation and use of resources. 
• Underlines the cost consequences of choices and allows purchases to be 
made in anticipation of future funded orders.  
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• Provides managers with the financial authority and flexibility to procure 
and use manpower, materials, and other resources more effectively.  
• Improves cost estimates and cost control through comparison of estimates 
and actual costs.  
• Places customers in the position of critically evaluating purchase prices 
and the quality of goods and services ordered. 
• Allows for greater flexibility and security in decision making as there are 
no fiscal year limitations.  
• Establishes standard prices or stabilized rates and unit prices for goods and 
services furnished by NWCF Business Areas, enabling customers to plan 
and budget more confidently (Ibid). 
C. NWCF OPERATION 
The term revolving fund is derived from the cyclical nature in which cash 
revolves into and out of the account. Customers replenish the fund by purchasing goods 
and services, while at the same time cash outflows finance the expenses necessary to 
produce the desired goods and services. A key to effectively managing these accounts is 
in accurately determining the total costs incurred in providing services and in forecasting 
the level at which these services will be demanded. To be considered for management 
using a NWCF, four criteria must be met: 
• There must be identifiable goods and services provided. 
• Customers requiring those outputs must also be identifiable. 
• An approved accounting system must be utilized. 
• An evaluation of the advantages and disadvantages of establishing a 
buyer/ seller relationship must be conducted (Candreva 2005, p.93). 
Once an activity group (e.g., Navy depot maintenance) is established under 
NWCF management, a one-time appropriation or a transfer of funds from related 
appropriations, which will be supported by the new NWCF account, are used to create the 
initial pool of capital for the activity group. This capital is called a corpus. After funding 
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an activity group’s initial corpus, those activities are no longer subject to an 
appropriation, but are solely reliant on customer orders to support the cost of their 
operations (Ibid). This makes accurate accounting of the total costs for each activity 
extremely important.  
 
1. Cost Accounting for the NWCF 
NWCFs recover costs using the unit cost concept (OSD Comptroller iCenter). The 
unit cost of an organization can be determined by dividing the total cost of its outputs by 
the total units of output produced. In short, the unit cost is the average cost for an 
organization to produce one unit of output. Figure 6 provides a simplified version of how 
this is accomplished: 
 
 
Figure 6.   Unit Cost Calculation 
      (From Author) 
 
Fleet Shipyard Incorporated (FSI) is a company that employs 100 workers and provides 
maintenance to keep its customers ships operational. Based on past experience and in talking 
with its customers, it anticipates it will incur the follow expenses in the upcoming year: 
 
Labor Expense- (100 workers)*($100/hr)*(2000 hrs/yr) =    $20,000,000 
Expected Materiel expenses =      $30,000,000 
Overhead =         $7,000,000 
Depreciation =         $3,000,000 
Total Expected Expenses =       $60,000,000 
 
In this example, FSI expects to incur a total of $60,000,000 in expenses for 2007. This 
number represents its Annual Operating Budget (AOB). It has decided to allocate those 
expenses on a direct labor hour (DLH) basis; for every hour one person works on a job, a set 
price is charged to that job. FSI employs 100 workers who will work 2000 hours each this 
year. However, some time is spent on training, break periods, etc. and so it expects each 
employee to spend 1500 hours on direct labor for its customers this year. The total DLH’s 
available is: 
 
(100 workers)*(1500 hours) = 150,000 DLH 
 
To recover all of its expected costs, the following calculation determines the price FSI will 
charge to its customers: 
 
($60,000,000 Expenses) / (150,000 DLH) = $400 / DLH 
 
For every hour one person works on a job, the customer is billed $400. This represents the 
price, known as the stabilized billing rate, FSI will charge for the following year. 
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a. Full Cost Recovery  
An important difference between MF and NWCF is in calculating the total 
cost of operations. As explained in Chapter III, organizations funded with direct 
appropriations do not budget for many of the costs incurred by their activity; instead they 
are funded by separate appropriations. For example, military personnel, funded through 
the MILPERS appropriation, are separately funded assets. However, organizations that 
operate under the NWCF are responsible for full cost recovery. Military personnel costs, 
along with all other costs of doing business6, are required to be captured. This total cost 
visibility is designed to link costs to outputs, providing managers with the information 
necessary to establish causal relationships between costs and cost objects. This helps to 
determine why costs were incurred, and to better provide services while minimizing the 
cost associated with those services. 
 
D. NWCF BUDGET PROCESS 
NWCF activities prepare an operating budget and a capital budget. The operating 
budget includes all direct, indirect, and general and administrative expenses expected for 
the budgeted year. The capital budget consists of the funding requested for investment 
expenses such as software, infrastructure, equipment and minor construction. Similar to 
the MF budget process, these cost estimates flow from the lowest organization level to 
the highest. Individual activities forward their operating and capital budget information to 
their activity group manager, who then forwards the collective information to the Service 
level. Final adjustments are made for inflation, pay increases and other fact of life 
changes. The Services also attempt to balance the NWCF budget forecast with the 
maintenance budget requests for the customers the NWCF serves. The final NWCF 
budget and unit cost information are then submitted to DoD as part of the overall DoD 
BES (See Figure 7). DoD then issues a composite billing rate for each activity group. It is 
important to note, however, that individual activities can utilize subsidiary rates that more 
accurately track their costs as long as the collective sum of these individual rates meets 
                                                 
6 Some costs, such as war reserves, underutilized plant capacity, and mobilization costs are still funded 
through direct appropriations. These items are deemed necessary for National Security, and are thus not 
included in the NWCF model (DoD FMR 2004, p.9-11). 
 37
the intent of the collective activity group rate (Candreva 2005, p.100). This allows 
flexibility in assigning billing rates at separate activities, whose production levels may 
vary significantly, and thus can spread fixed costs over a large customer base, helps to 
minimize substantial profits or losses at individual organizations.  
 
 
Figure 7.   NWCF Budget/ Rate Setting Process 





Shipyard Composite Rate 
$$ / DLH 
Department of Defense 
USD (C) 
 
- Includes NWCF budgets in BES 
- Sets shipyard depot composite rates 
Department of the Navy 
Office of Budget 
 
- Make final adjustments 
- Balance NWCF and MF submissions 
Naval Sea Systems Command 
(NAVSEA) 
 
- Combines budget forecasts for 
  all NWCF shipyards (activity groups) 
Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard 
Depot Maintenance Activity 
 
- Estimates outputs and costs 
- Assigns unit costs 
Individual Shipyards set 
Subsidiary Billing Rates to 
better match specific costs 
$$ / DLH 
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E. NWCF MANAGEMENT 
Looking again at Figure 6, if FSI were a private company, included in its unit cost 
would be an amount above $400 to allow it to earn a profit on its investment. However, 
DoD activities are not interested in making a profit, since they are not required to earn a 
return to the providers of the capital they use. The difference between an activity group’s 
costs and the revenue it collects on an annual basis is referred to as the Net Operating 
Result (NOR). NWCFs seek to break even in their operations by achieving a NOR of 
zero. Real life changes in items such as customer demand, actual billable DLHs, and 
material costs can result in differences between actual revenue and expenses. Profits are 
displayed as a positive NOR, and losses as a negative NOR. Over the life of an account 
this difference is called the Accumulated Operating Result (AOR). To achieve a zero 
AOR over the life of an account, positive or negative NORs are rolled into the future 
billing rates an activity group charges (OSD Comptroller iCenter). An exception to this 
for depot maintenance activities is that gains or losses of over $10M are required to be 
resolved during the current FY (or the first quarter of the following FY if they occur 
during the fourth quarter of a FY) (DoD FMR 2004, p.9-12). 
 
F. WORKING CAPITAL FUND RESTRICTIONS 
As discussed in Chapter III, one of the biggest challenges of operating with 
mission funded appropriations is meeting the restrictions Congress places on the 
obligational authority it provides. MF organizations must ensure expenses meet their 
authorized purpose, that they are obligated and liquidated within the allowable time 
period, and that they do not spend more than the amount appropriated. NWCFs have no 
such restrictions. While the customers they serve still must wrestle with these restrictions 
in determining what services to request and when, a NWCF shipyard has no fiscal year 
limitations in providing its services. NWCF organizations can provide their services at 
any level desired, constrained only by the capacity of their facility and the demand of 
their customers. Also, in the short term, by operating with a negative NOR, NWCFs 
allow shipyards, by essentially under charging the price of their services, to provide the 
Fleet with more maintenance than would otherwise be possible under MF. While this 
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method of operation can be seen as short sighted, since it sacrifices future maintenance 
costs for those of today, it is additional operational flexibility that MF does not offer. 
Despite the freedom from appropriations oversight, the NWCF does have 
operating limitations to which managers must adhere. 
 
1. Cash Management Restrictions 
The availability of cash is of extreme importance for the NWCF. Activities pay 
their day to day expenses with the cash received from the services they provide; and 
while the NWCF can operate at a loss (negative NOR), improper cash management can 
result in insufficient funds to pay those expenses, which becomes an Anti-Deficiency Act 
violation (DoD FMR 2004, p.9-3). To prevent this, DoD Financial Management 
Regulations require NWCF activity groups to maintain cash levels to cover 7 to 10 days 
of operational costs and 4 to 6 months of capital asset disbursements (Ibid, p.9-2). To 
meet this requirement, plans are developed by activity groups to facilitate the cash flow 
management process. These plans are created annually and submitted with the BES. They 
coordinate collections, disbursements, appropriations, and estimates of other cash 
transactions (Ibid, p.9-3). Since the responsibility of cash management is maintained at 
the activity group level (NAVSEA for shipyards), scheduling changes and emergent 
repairs must be coordinated at a higher level than the shipyard itself, which can cause 
delays. Deviations in schedules can also have a ripple effect on the cash flow 
management at the other NWCF shipyards controlled by NAVSEA. 
 
2. Efficiency Limitations 
NWCFs are limited in the business aspects they promote. Shipyard managers do 
not operate in a vacuum when making decisions about their operations. The maintenance 
they perform is of the utmost importance for National Security.  As a result, some costs 
that might not make sense from a business perspective are still deemed necessary. This 
can manifest itself in excessive inventory, contingent equipment, surge capacity and other 
costs to protect against what if scenarios. Some of this expense is mitigated through a 
separately funded appropriation; however, there are real limitations to business practices 
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in an environment where profit is not the sole purpose of the business. In addition, the 
cost reduction incentive that exists in the private market is artificial within DoD. 
Shipyards know their customer, and their customer is essentially tied to the shipyard for 
their maintenance work. Thus, the pressures that cause cost improvements in the private 
sector, the desire to keep or gain business and to earn a higher profit, are not present in a 
public shipyard environment. Instead, the drive of vigilant management and the real 
possibility of a future of dwindling defense funds must provide this incentive. 
 41
V. MISSION FUNDING VS. WORKING CAPITAL FUNDING 
As discussed in Chapter II, the RMP undertaken by the CNO consisted of three 
phases. Phase I aimed to optimize capacity and eliminate redundancy of effort by 
establishing Regional Repair Centers. Phase II then integrated intermediate- and depot-
level activities into Regional Maintenance Centers (RMC). Phase III represented the end 
state, the entire Fleet conducting its maintenance in a common way, capable of sharing 
resources and operating as one shipyard.  
The RMP began implementation in Pearl Harbor with the combination of its two 
separate IMAs into one Navy Intermediate Maintenance Activity (Phase I). Subsequently, 
the Navy consolidated the new IMA with the PHNS depot-level maintenance 
organization (Phase II). This process was later repeated at the PSNS.  
Phase II represented the more difficult of the two restructurings. Prior to the 
regionalization effort, the PHNS operated under the control of NAVSEA and was 
incorporated in the NWCF. Both IMAs were mission funded under the command of the 
COMPACLFT, and the combined IMA operated in the same fashion. Full integration of 
the two maintenance activities required the merger of separate chains of command as 
well as different financial systems. It was decided to place the new PHNS and IMF under 
the managerial control of COMPACLFT7, and to finance the entire organization using 
direct appropriations. The funding decision was made so the Fleet could incorporate its 
new organization into its already established funding structure (GAO 2001, p.25). 
As PHNS was the first regionalized and consolidated maintenance activity of the 
CNO’s RMP, and was thus a model for future consolidations, the Navy implemented the 
Pearl Harbor Pilot in 1998 to assess the consolidation’s impact on cost, performance and 
productivity. The metrics used to evaluate the consolidation were: 
 
 
                                                 
7 NAVSEA would still maintain control over the technical requirements and maintenance operating 
procedures for the ships, while the execution of those requirements fell under PACFLT 
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• Direct labor hour cost. 
• Total shop labor hours required to deliver a customer direct labor hour (A 
measure of personnel utilization). 
• Productivity, measured by number of CSMP items completed 
• Productivity, measured by CSMP backlog growth or reduction. 
• Schedule adherence. 
• Quality, measured by the number of deficiencies requiring rework. 
• Efficiency, measured by the actual labor hours required to complete a job 
compared to the budgeted labor hours expected to be required. 
• Quality, measured by the number of failure reports within 6 months of 
maintenance. 
• Earned value, measured by the labor hours required to complete similar 
work items (GAO 2001, p.26). 
 
It is important to note that the purpose of the Pearl Harbor Pilot was not to 
determine the superiority of one financing method over another, but to measure the 
benefits of maintenance consolidation and to determine the worth of continuing with 
further consolidations.  
The effectiveness of the Pilot in measuring cost reductions and manpower 
utilization improvements has been scrutinized twice by the GAO, first in 1999, and then 
with a follow up report in 2001. Both, to varying degrees, evaluated the consolidations as 
holding the potential for sustained maintenance improvements at Pearl Harbor, and across 
Navy maintenance. The GAO also showed concern for the disagreement between the 
Navy and the DoD regarding the appropriateness of choosing mission funding over 
working capital funding as the preferred shipyard financing method. There were concerns 
about the overall health of the rest of the NWCF if the shipyards were removed, but 
specific to the shipyards, the following issues were identified: 
• The potential loss of financial flexibility for shipyard managers due to the 
fiscal year restrictions placed on directly appropriated funds. 
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• The loss of cost visibility for shipyards as they moved away from the 
NWCF, which was designed, in part, to provide a funding mechanism that 
mimicked the cost accounting and management principles of the private 
sector. 
• The loss of the buyer/ seller relationship between the shipyard and the 
Fleet, which encouraged cost control and responsiveness to customer 
requirements (GAO 1999, p.20-21). 
 
A. PUGET SOUND PROTOTYPE 
Despite these concerns, the completion of the Pearl Harbor Pilot showed positive 
results for the consolidation process, and in continuing with the RMP’s goal of a single 
maintenance process, the Navy recommended shifting all shipyards to mission funding. 
However, Program Budget Decision (PBD) 700C, “Navy Amended Budget Estimates 
Submission,” January 7, 2003, created another pilot program; a two-year prototype at the 
Puget Sound Naval Shipyard. This prototype integrated intermediate maintenance and 
depot-level activities and financing operations with mission funding, as was done at Pearl 
Harbor; the goal of the prototype was to determine the shipyard’s ability to display the 
total cost visibility and performance accountability under mission funding as was 
achieved by the NWCF (DoD IG 2005, p.2). The metrics used to demonstrate this ability 
were: 
• A document called a virtual 1307 report. This was based on NWCF 
Accounting Report 1307, used to document the total cost of shipyard 
operations. 
• The ship availability schedule report, a measure of maintenance schedule 
adherence. 
• The post availability quality report. 
• Customer appraisals of the quality of maintenance performed (Ibid.). 
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B. PROBLEMS WITH USING SHIPYARD DATA  
The Puget Sound Pilot built upon the Pearl Harbor Pilot, in that it again displayed 
the benefits of the RMP as a more efficient use of the Navy’s maintenance resources. The 
additional goal of producing NWCF cost visibility in a mission funded environment, 
however, uncovered the difficulty in identifying specific metrics and producing the data 
that could positively confirm one financing method as superior to the other. The DoD 
Inspector General was highly critical of the study, as it felt the Navy was using metrics 
that built upon the Pearl Harbor Pilot showing the benefits of consolidation, but were 
used to justify mission funding as the preferred method of shipyard financing. This 
criticism identifies one of two major difficulties in examining data from either shipyard 
to determine the better of the funding mechanisms. The combination of the IMAs and the 
consolidation of the maintenance activities that occurred simultaneously with the change 
in funding method, along with significant changes in shipyard maintenance requirements 
due to the war on terror and other Navy and Defense initiatives, has made the effect of 
changing the funding mechanism difficult to isolate. The Navy’s motivation for choosing 
the metrics it used to evaluate the Puget Sound Prototype may have been to show its 
consolidation plan in a positive light, but it is worth noting that when the CBO published 
an interim report comparing the NWCF and MF at Navy shipyards, the metrics it 
recommended for further study were also of an overall shipyard performance basis, not 
an attempt to isolate the funding mechanism variable. They also included variances of 
three of the four performance metrics used in the Puget Sound Prototype (CBO 2005, 
p.15). 
The other major problem in using shipyard performance to identify one method as 
being preferable over another is that cost visibility, in and of itself, does not produce 
savings; improved performance and increased savings are the result of management’s 
ability to effectively employ the data they can collect. In other words, even the greatest of 
metrics do not evaluate the NWCF vs. MF, but instead evaluate the shipyard managers 
who use their available data to improve performance. 
For these two reasons, the determination of which shipyard financial structure is 
preferred should be made based on the examination of the potential advantages and 
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disadvantages of each method. The areas of cost visibility and operational and financial 
flexibility were chosen since these were the cornerstones on which the arguments for 
each method were made. 
 
C. ANALYSIS OF OPERATIONAL AND FINANCIAL FLEXIBILITY 
 
1. Personnel Flexibility 
 
a. Personnel Cost 
One problem encountered after the west coast shipyards were shifted to 
mission funding was that, during spikes in labor requirements, employing workers from 
NWCF maintenance activities (i.e. borrowing workers from an east coast shipyard) came 
at an incredible cost to the pocketbook of the mission funded activities. NWCF workers 
require a funded customer order and are employed at the NWCF fully burdened DLH 
rate. Conversely, if PHNS wanted to borrow workers from the mission funded PSNS, the 
only cost was the incremental travel expense, since all other expenses had already been 
paid through other appropriations.  
From the standpoint of someone looking at the forest, and not the trees, in 
this scenario the overall cost is the same under either method. However, the Fleet does 
not get to operate with a big picture budget. Its funds are budgeted for nearly two years in 
advance, and once set, are limited by a statutory ceiling. From their perspective, it is of 
great advantage to have as much of the fixed costs associated with maintenance covered 
by means other than the labor rate they are charged. Then, when mission changes 
invariably occur (particularly increases), the corresponding incremental increase in their 
expense to purchase more shipyard maintenance is as low as possible. This increases the 
flexibility of the Fleet by allowing it to stretch its own pot of money further before it 
must request a reprogramming of funds from other accounts or a supplemental 




b. Workforce Utilization 
Since the revenue a NWCF shipyard receives is based on the number of 
DLHs applied to a job, tracking this number is extremely important. As such, the Navy 
has seen the administrative requirements and job cost repercussions of quickly moving 
workers and assigning extra personnel to certain jobs as being a major cause of workforce 
underutilization at the shipyards. Its documents showed approximately 100 to 200 
workers were daily assigned to its excess labor shop as a result (GAO 1999, p.12). Under 
MF, shipyard commanders can reassign workers immediately upon priority changes 
without either administrative burdens or financial accounting considerations. 
Although these advantages are very real, the same flexibility has been 
achieved at the NNS by having the Fleet purchase a set number of labor days as a 
separate expense item. Under this plan, they have had access to approximately 100 
workers to generally assign to their IMF as needed (CBO 2005, p.13). Also, although the 
shift to MF reduced the number of personnel assigned to excess labor to about 10 per day 
at Pearl Harbor, the process for assigning workers has changed to the point that excess 
workers are no longer identified by mission funded shipyards (GAO 2001, p.43). In this 
case, it seems there was a clear tradeoff between accurate, relevant data and immediate 
response capability. The 100 to 200 extra workers identified by the NWCF that were seen 
as being underutilized could have possibly been unnecessary (if the production schedule 
was not compromised by their absence), and could have eventually been eliminated. 
Although personnel should not be viewed as a variable cost that can be changed annually 
to adjust for demand, without tracking unused workers, personnel overcapacity will never 
be able to be positively identified as a possible cost saving area.  
 
2. Financial Flexibility 
 
a. Fiscal Year Flexibility 
As described in Chapters III and IV, the nature of direct appropriations 
places significant fiscal year dependant restrictions on MF organizations that NWCF 
activities do not face. These added restrictions have raised concerns regarding the ability 
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of a MF shipyard to provide maintenance service to the Fleet in the event of a funding 
gap caused by a delay in an appropriation.  
In theory, this is true. A shipyard operating under the NWCF is essentially 
free from the fiscal year limitations imposed on MF, and can incur costs without the 
written authorization of an appropriation. However, Navy shipyards do not operate in a 
vacuum. In order to incur costs, they must receive revenue from their customers. The 
only two customers Navy shipyards serve are the Fleet and NAVSEA, both of which are 
MF organizations. This means that, in the event of a funding gap, although the shipyard 
could incur costs without regard to appropriation delays, it would be illegal for their only 
customers to purchase the maintenance they provide. Under either funding method, 
shipyards would be permitted to continue projects that had been previously obligated but 
not yet executed.  
Funding gaps are not uncommon for government agencies, however most 
are typically only a few days in duration and cause little disruption. The disruptions 
caused by funding gaps, and even the additional restrictions placed on activities when 
funding gaps are plugged by continuing resolutions, affect the obligation authority of the 
customers buying the shipyards’ services and NWCF shipyards cannot divorce 
themselves from the laws placed on appropriated funds. 
 
b. Maintenance Costs Exceed Appropriations 
When budgets are formulated by shipyard customers and rates are set for 
shipyard services, rates for materials, personnel expenses and other items must be 
estimated as they cannot be known for sure in advance. For a MF organization, due to the 
statutory ceiling on its spending authority, an increase in costs above what is budgeted for 
results in fewer goods and services that can be provided. Fleet customers operating with a 
NWCF shipyard have additional flexibility in this regard, however, due to the ability to 
carry a negative NOR. In short, the Fleet can continue to pay the budgeted price and have 
the shipyard eat the loss as it provides goods and services (if they have gone up in cost). 
In this way, the Fleet can buy the same amount of service as it has budgeted for 
regardless of price fluctuations. 
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This flexibility can be of advantage; however it does come at a price. One 
year’s negative NOR is rolled into the following year’s rate, meaning the cost of the next 
year’s services will include any real cost increases plus the cost increases absorbed by the 
shipyard the previous year. As described in Chapter IV (p.56), NWCF shipyards can 
adjust their rates quarterly to alleviate a large NOR. In this way, the Navy can choose 
whether it wants to sacrifice future maintenance costs for additional service now, or if it 
wants to buy its services at as close to the going rate as possible. 
 
3. Decision Making Authority 
Under the NWCF, all shipyard operations are directly linked to the funding they 
receive for customer orders. All operating expenses are covered with these funds, and for 
this reason maintenance priorities are heavily influenced by the availability of funds, 
whether from the Fleet or from NAVSEA. MF shipyards, since they receive their 
operating budget from Congress, are out from under the requirement to perform the work 
that has been paid for by individual customers and the burdens associated with shifting 
priorities, administrative and financial. The Navy feels this organizational structure puts 
maintenance decisions fully in the hands of the Fleet Commanders instead of Fleet 
support activities (NAVSEA). In this way, the Navy is better able to perform its overall 
mission (CBO 2006, p.9). It has been pointed out that unscheduled, emergent 
availabilities have occurred and been successfully accomplished when all shipyards were 
under the NWCF, and that quantitatively proving this increased responsiveness would be 
extremely difficult (CBO 2005, p.14). 
Even without being tied to individual customer orders, MF shipyards are not 
completely free from making maintenance decisions based on financial realities. When 
preparing their operating budgets, MF shipyards spread their costs between the OMN 
work they plan to perform for the Fleet and the lower priority modifications and 
overhauls requested by NAVSEA, for which they are reimbursed separately. If the 
shipyard expected to receive 25% of their required funds from NAVSEA reimbursable 
maintenance work, it would budget only for the remaining 75% to be allotted from the 
Fleet. When executing its mission, the Fleet would maintain authority over which work is 
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performed and the priorities therein, but only to the point at which its 75% funding runs 
out. At some point the shipyard must perform the reimbursable work to cover its annual 
costs, regardless of what priority that maintenance represents (COMSUBPAC Official 
Interview). 
 
D. ANALYSIS OF COST VISIBILITY 
The NWCF is seen as advantageous by DoD because it creates a customer/ 
provider relationship, uses private business techniques to identify total cost and provides 
managers with improved cost and performance data for more effective and efficient 
decision making (OSD Comptroller iCenter). There are several reasons, however, why it 
is difficult to operate a Navy shipyard in a private sector manner.  
 
1. Customer/ Provider Relationship 
The benefit of a buyer/ seller relationship is the perceived pressure the customer 
places on a business. If the service provided is not of good quality or is seen as too 
expensive, the customer will buy the service elsewhere and the seller will suffer. This 
provides a continual incentive for businesses to innovate and to operate efficiently and 
effectively in order to provide a service which the customer sees as a value compared to 
competitors. This does not exist in a shipyard environment. The lack of competition, due 
to the shrinking of the U.S. shipbuilding industry, regulations regarding where certain 
maintenance can be performed and the obvious convenience of performing maintenance 
at the nearest shipyard (and cost of traveling elsewhere), has resulted in little, if any, 
incentive to reduce the cost of operations (Trunkey and Choi 1996). There is certainly 
incentive for NWCF organizations to account for their total cost of operations, since their 
operations rely on positive cash flow, and negative annual NORs receive significant 
scrutiny. A lack of consumer pressure, however, is evident in the fact that one year’s 
operating loss can be immediately applied to the following year’s DLH rate, absorbed 
entirely by the customer. Imagine the General Motors’ sales figures if they attempted to 
write last year’s losses into the price of their new automobiles. Navy shipyards and the 
Fleet that utilizes them are not providers and customers in the traditional sense. They are 
two executive organizations that carry out congress policy. 
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2. Private Business Practices 
 
a. Cost Accounting 
Activity Based Costing (ABC) is the term often used to describe the 
method used by the NWCF to determine the true cost of its service and ensure full cost 
recovery. The goal of ABC is to correctly assign every cost an organization incurs to the 
proper product or service that caused that expense. It is useful in focusing an organization 
on the profitability of each individual product or service provided rather than only being 
able to judge an organization on its profitability as a whole. It can aid in pricing and is a 
tool for determining the strategic direction a company should take (Garrison and Noreen 
2003, p.314). 
The depot level activities under the NWCF identify the process of 
determining the DLH to charge as being ABC, but when the costs of every service and 
maintenance item the shipyard produces are all lumped together and divided by the 
number of hours worked, all that is achieved is an average price. This does not determine 
the true cost of each of these services; nor does it correctly allocate the shipyard’s 
expenses to the services that incur them. This system provides managers no more 
information to make performance and cost decisions than is available from mission 
funding budget justification materials. True ABC would determine the cost of each 
individual process performed by the shipyard. The cost incurred by the shipyard to 
perform preservative maintenance on a ship is not anywhere close to the cost of 
performing seawater system maintenance on submarine hull penetrations. Being able to 
distinguish these two services and make decisions about which to exploit or to stop 
providing, and to attack specific inefficiencies are what can make ABC a very useful tool. 
When every DLH is essentially assigned the same price, these tools are not available to 
shipyard managers. Every ship’s maintenance availability is unique in job size and work 
performed, so it becomes very difficult to find the inefficiencies from this one variable 
(DLH), particularly when a DLH consists of an aggregate of all costs. 
Also important to understand is, even when inefficiencies are discovered, 
shipyard managers do not necessarily have the authority to reduce overhead or 
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manpower, to stop providing services that lose money, or to affect change in many of the 
costs their commands incur (Trunkey and Choi 1996). The variables that a shipyard 
manager does have control over are the personnel and resource utilization and other 
variable costs, which are readily available under mission funding. The GAO cited this 
fact when it noted that, although the mission funding system did not account for the cost 
incurred by separate appropriations (which had been previously tracked under the 
NWCF), it did not directly affect the shipyard commander’s ability to manage the 
maintenance (GAO 2001, p.31). 
 
b. Depreciation Expense 
Under the NWCF, all capital expenditures exceeding $100,000 (except for 
major construction items) and having a useful life of greater than two years are approved 
through the NWCF Capital Budget. These costs are then counted as assets and become a 
depreciation expense charged to the customer throughout their useful life. (DoD FMR 
2004, Vol. 2B p.9-4) Conversely, for MF organizations, the threshold is $250,000, above 
which any capital expense is funded by the appropriate procurement account for that 
expense (DoD FMR 2004, Vol. 2A p.1-12). 
The NWCF method conforms more closely to that of a typical private 
business. Including the costs of sustaining the infrastructure necessary to carry out the 
services a shipyard provides displays the true cost to its customers. However, in the same 
way as when personnel and other fixed costs are funded through other appropriations, 
capital expenditures paid by procurement funds improve the financial flexibility of the 
Fleet when priorities and maintenance levels change. 
 
3. Cost Visibility for Senior Officials 
When a lack of cost visibility is cited as a being a negative aspect of MF, rather 
than criticizing the performance capability of a shipyard under mission funding, the 
concern has been with the cost reporting visibility available to senior Navy, OSD and 
Congressional officials (GAO 1999, p.21/ GAO 2001, p.31/ DoD IG 2005, p.8/ CBO 
2006, p.1). Under the NWCF, the Navy produced a quarterly and annual Financial 
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Statement detailing all costs, revenues and operating information for each individual 
shipyard. Additionally, the NWCF has a separate section within the Navy BES which 
outlines shipyard cost and performance information for each shipyard. While both reports 
are also published for mission funded appropriations, the information is spread amongst 
the separate appropriations that fund them and thus is not as readily available when 
examining an individual shipyard. Again, this is of no effect to the operational and 
decision making ability of the shipyard manager. It only changes the format of the reports 
created for reviewing authority to the standard format of all other MF activities. The 
decrease in cost visibility cited in the previous reports has been in regard to the difficulty 
in pulling the information previously used to report the total cost of a shipyard under the 
NWCF, all of which was controlled by the shipyard, from the various budget activities 
that now control the funding of personnel, capital expenditures, etc. These activities 
collect and track information in ways very different from the NWCF, which can make 
some shipyard specific information difficult to obtain.  
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
To better utilize its resources and more effectively provide Fleet maintenance, the 
Navy significantly changed its shipyard maintenance organizational model. As part of 
this restructuring, it became clear that a common funding method was necessary at its 
regional maintenance activities if the full benefits of consolidation were to be achieved. 
Significant work has been done to analyze the outcome of the Navy’s consolidation 
efforts, but this thesis sought to independently examine the merits of mission funding and 
the Navy Working Capital Fund, as they apply to Navy shipyards. To do this, this thesis 
laid aside the cost, productivity and worker utilization metrics that have been influenced 
by factors other than funding method, and analyzed the implicit differences between the 
two funding structures within the shipyard environment. The areas examined were those 
of cost visibility and of operational and financial flexibility. 
 
A. COST VISIBILITY 
In the area of cost visibility, the operational capability of Navy shipyards has not 
suffered from the change to a MF structure. The necessary information required to make 
managerial decisions that optimize a shipyard’s resources is available to the shipyard 
commander. Indeed, if it could be shown that MF handicaps managerial effectiveness, 
then an entire revamping of the appropriations process would be warranted to ensure 
proper cost accountability. Shipyards are able to track their performance and costs in the 
same manner as any other appropriated functions; and the personnel, overhead and other 
costs incurred by shipyards, but funded through other organizations, can also be 
effectively tracked by the commands who manage them. 
 
1. Cost Reporting 
The cost visibility problems the Navy has encountered have been in reporting 
total costs to senior Navy, OSD and Congressional officials in the same manner as was 
previously reported under the NWCF (even though the shipyards are no longer 
responsible for the governance of many of these costs). Since this problem does not affect 
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the shipyard operations, it should not be viewed as a disadvantage of MF compared to the 
NWCF, but as an administrative reporting problem to be rectified with changes to future 
reports. This correction was formally requested by Congress in the FY 2006 National 
Defense Authorization Act (Section 322) and the Navy has responded with a 
recommendation of the following changes to their budget justification materials: 
• Modifications to the Ship Depot Maintenance exhibit that track workload 
by individual shipyard and specific ships. 
• A new comprehensive budget exhibit entitled Naval Shipyards. 
• Modification of performance data to include the comparison of individual 
shipyards. 
• A new procurement line item entitled Shipyard Capital Investment. (CBO 
2006, p.12) 
 
Additionally the Navy has proposed changes to its Annual Budget Management 
Report to better match the data previously available under the NWCF, including: 
• The sum of the obligation authority provided from all appropriation 
accounts used to support Navy shipyards. 
• All shipyard costs consolidated into one exhibit. 
• Information related to capital expenditures and military construction. 
• Personnel and labor management performance data (Ibid, p.16-17). 
 
These changes should provide for satisfactory analysis of the operational 
effectiveness of each individual shipyard, and allow officials to compare shipyard data in 
a manner similar to that under the NWCF, effectively neutralizing any perceived 
advantages the NWCF maintained in cost reporting quality. 
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2. Business Practices 
The NWCF provides no clear advantage in terms of a shipyard commander’s 
ability to effectively and efficiently manage his assets. The cost accounting tools utilized 
do not advance the available financial data beyond that of mission funding performance 
and budget reports, and the customer/ provider relationship touted as a being a driver for 
continual cost and quality improvement is artificial at best. Shipyards do not serve the 
Fleet in the way a private sector company serves its customers. It may be said that the 
truest customers a shipyard serves are the Navy, DoD and Congress, which prepare 
budgets and allocate resources to determine the amount of maintenance the Fleet will 
conduct, and in this way purchase National Defense. Shipyards and the Fleet work 
together to maximize the use of these appropriations for Fleet maintenance under either 
funding method, but in a public setting, it seems that the most performance pressure a 
shipyard would face is when it is placed under the authority of the Fleet it serves. The 
nature of this relationship drives cost improvements and efficiency when the shipyard 
must compete with other programs (during the budget formulation process) for its portion 
of the Fleet’s limited resources. 
 
B. OPERATIONAL AND FINANCIAL FLEXIBILITY 
 
1. Operational Flexibility 
Due to the fact that most of the fixed costs associated with shipyard operations are 
separately funded, mission funded shipyards have more financial flexibility when 
schedule changes and emergent operations occur. These fixed costs, the costs that occur 
annually, independent of the amount of maintenance performed, have already been 
covered. Therefore, the cost to the Fleet to purchase additional maintenance consists only 
of the incremental costs (the costs that are incurred because of the additional 
maintenance) of the maintenance requested. Under the NWCF, fixed and variable costs 
are both rolled into the DLH rate, the average rated required to recover all costs based on 
the estimated number of billable hours the shipyard expects to work. Once this amount of 
maintenance has been reached, all costs have been covered, and if additional maintenance 
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is requested, the only real cost is the variable costs associated with performing the 
maintenance. However, the rate charged is still the original DLH rate. In this way, the 
NWCF overcharges for maintenance performed above the level required to cover its fixed 
costs, and prevents the Fleet from employing any excess shipyard capacity to the 
maximum extent of its funding. Additionally, the worker tracking requirements of the 
NWCF, to ensure proper cost recovery, hinder the shipyard commander’s ability to 
reassign workers. These administrative financial accounting burdens disappear under MF, 
further improving operational flexibility.  
A negative aspect of this flexibility is that the ability to freely move workers has 
come at the cost of effectively tracking personnel overcapacity. However, shipyard 
commanders have little control over the manning strength of their activities, so it is not a 
cost that can be managed on their level, but at the level of those who determine manning 
requirements. Also, Congress and DoD have deemed it a necessary National security 
investment to maintain excess shipyard capacity, to accommodate surge requirements 
(U.S. Code Title 10, sec. 2464). It seems appropriate to allow those who operate the 
shipyards the freedom to utilize this capacity as is seen fit rather than idling personnel 
resources (in excess labor shops). 
 
2. Financial Flexibility 
NWCF shipyards, in and of themselves, maintain significant financial freedom 
compared to MF. They are bound by none of the fiscal year requirements MF 
organizations must adhere to, and face no spending uncertainty during appropriations 
delays. The caveat to this is that, since the only activities that utilize Navy shipyards are 
MF, in order for any funds to reach the shipyards, they must first have met the regulations 
from which the NWCF is supposedly free. Funding gaps prevent the Fleet from 
purchasing maintenance shipyards could legally continue to provide. 
Financial flexibility does exist for NWCF shipyards when the costs of services 
vary, but even this is minimal. Although shipyards under the NWCF are permitted to 
carry a negative NOR, thus allowing the Fleet to temporarily purchase more maintenance 
than it can really afford, the statutory limit on this is $10 million, over which cost 
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differences must be recouped during the current fiscal year. This amount of leeway is not 
enough to prevent a reprogramming of funds or the possibility of a supplemental 
appropriation request in the event of a large unexpected Fleet maintenance requirement, 
therefore the NWCF should not be seen as being more than minimally advantageous to 
MF in terms of financial flexibility. 
 
C. FINAL RESULTS 
Solid metrics to explicitly verify one funding method over another will probably 
never be available. The many variables that exist make it extremely difficult to 
effectively isolate the effects of funding method alone. Additionally, the differences in 
work from one maintenance job to the next, along with ever changing Fleet readiness 
requirements, muddle the picture even more. Furthermore, funding changes alone do not 
produce results. Results stem only from management’s use of available information and 
the ability to overcome the restrictions under which it is placed. To truly measure the 
effects of the NWCF to MF, the same manager would have to operate the same shipyard 
with the exact same maintenance requirements over a considerable period of time under 
each funding method, which is clearly impractical and essentially impossible. While a 
less stringent model could possibly provide an indication of the effects of a funding 
change, the significant shipyard structural changes and maintenance requirement changes 
that have coincided the funding shifts at Pearl Harbor and Puget Sound have prevented 
this possibility. 
Rather than looking at specific performance metrics (see p.55-56), this thesis 
approached the question of which funding method best supports a Navy shipyard by 
examining the funding structure differences between both methods and evaluating how 
these differences provide exploitable opportunities for shipyard managers. Based on this 
analysis, the mission funded environment provides clear operational advantages with 
little, if any, financial capability drawbacks. This thesis supports the further 
implementation of mission funding for the two remaining public shipyards (Norfolk, Va. 
and Portsmouth, Me.) as is currently scheduled. 
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D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
This thesis has identified structural differences between the NWCF and MF that 
affect how organizational managers utilize their resources. Several options exist for 
continued study in this area. 
 
1. Naval Aviation Depots 
The maintenance organization used to conduct aviation maintenance for the Navy 
is very similar to that of a shipyard. However, there has been little discussion regarding a 
shift from the NWCF to MF for these depots. An examination of whether any differences 
between shipyards and aviation depots exist that could make the NWCF advantageous for 
the aviation community, or if a push toward MF at aviation depots would be beneficial is 
a topic to be considered. 
 
2. East Coast Shipyard Funding Shifts 
The Norfolk Naval Shipyard and Portsmouth Naval Shipyard will be shifted to a 
MF environment beginning in FY 2007. These two shipyards could provide a better 
opportunity to examine the performance effects of a funding shift. The radical changes to 
shipyard organization have already taken place, so year to year changes should be less 
dynamic, allowing for better isolation of funding change effects.  
 
3. One Shipyard 
Once the funding shifts at the final two shipyards takes place, it will allow for full 
implementation of the One Shipyard maintenance concept. A future study of the benefits 
achieved by this platform as well as possibilities for further alignment amongst the 
Navy’s four shipyards could be extremely beneficial. 
 59
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Aspin, Les, Secretary of Defense. Report on the Bottom Up Review. October 1993. 
 
Bachmann, Michael C. CAPT, USN. Depot Maintenance Restructuring and Weapon 
System Support: The Essential Role of Program Management Teams. Program 
Manager. September-October 1995.  
 
Candreva, Philip J., ed. Practical Financial Management: A Handbook for the Defense 
Department Financial Manager. 6th Edition, Rev. 1. United States Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, January 2005. 
 
Garrison, Ray H. and Noreen, Eric W. Managerial Accounting. Tenth Edition. McGraw-
Hill. New York 2003. 
Larson, E. V., Orletsky, D. T., Leuschner, K. Defense Planning in a Decade of Change: 
Lessons from the Base Force, Bottom-Up Review, and Quadrennial Defense 
Review. Rand publication MR-1387-AF. 2001. pp. 41-44. 
 
O’Rourke Ronald. CRS Report for Congress. Navy Ship Procurement Rate and the 
Planned Size of the Navy: Background and Issues for Congress. Report RS20535. 1 
March 2002. 
 
OSD Comptroller iCenter website. www.dtic.mil/comptroller/icenter/dwcf/htm Last 
accessed 12 March 2006. 
 
COMSUBPAC Official Interview with Author. Various phone conversations from 
January–March 2006. 
 
Saturno, James V. CRS Report for Congress, The Federal Budget Process: A Brief 
Outline. 96-368 GOV. 26 April 1996. 
Trunkey, R. Derek, and Jino Choi. 1996. The Defense Business Operations Fund (DBOF) 
Problems and Possible Solutions, Research Memorandum 95–196, Center for Naval 
Analyses, Alexandria, Va., March. 
Truver, Scott. U.S. Shipyards Navigate Between a Rock and a Hard Place. Proceedings 
Magazine. March 2004. 
http://www.usni.org/proceedings/Articles04/PRO03truver.htm  
Last accessed 27 May 2006. 
 
Tyskiewicz, Mary T. and Daggett, Stephen. CRS Report for Congress: A Defense Budget 
Primer. CRS Report RL30002. 9 December 1998. 
 
 60
U.S. Congress: Congressional Budget Office. Comparing Working-Capital Funding and 
Mission Funding for Naval Shipyards: An Interim Report. 1 December 2005. 
 
U.S. Congress: Congressional Research Service. Relationship Between Defense 
Authorization and Appropriation  Measures: In Brief. 
http://www.house.gov/hasc/about/pdfs/authapprops.pdf. Last accessed 12 February 
2006. 
 
U.S. Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2006. H.R. 2863.  
 
U.S. Department of Defense. Defense Depot Maintenance Council. Directive 5128.32. 
7 November 1990. 
 
U.S. Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation. Volume 2B, Chapter 9. 
June 2004. 
 
U.S. Department of Defense Inspector General Report. Puget Sound Naval Shipyard 
Mission-funded Prototype. D-2006-037. 9 December 2005. 
 
U.S. Department of Energy. Working Capital Fund: Guidebook for Creating and 
Managing a Working Capital Fund Business. February 2003. 
www.wcf.doe.gov/guides/GrayGuidebook.pdf Last accessed 12 March 2006. 
 
U.S. Department of the Navy: CNO Message. Regional Naval Maintenance Plan. 28 
March 1994. 
 
U.S. Department of the Navy. Maintenance Policy for U.S. Navy Ships. OPNAVINST 
4700.7K. 11 July, 2003. 
 
U.S. Department of the Navy. Ships’ Maintenance and Material Management (3-m) 
System Policy. OPNAVINST 4790.4D. 23 January 2004.  
 
U.S. Department of the Navy. Standard Organization and Regulations of the U.S. Navy, 
Chapter Nine: Ships Maintenance and Modernization. OPNAVINST 3120.32C. 11 
April 1994. 
 
U.S. General Accounting Office. Depot Maintenance:  Issues in Management and 
Restructuring  to Support a Downsized Military (GAO/NSIAD-93-13). 
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1993. 
 
U.S. General Accounting Office. Depot Maintenance: Key Financial Issues for 
Consolidations at Harbor Pilot and Elsewhere Are Still Unresolved (GAO-01-19). 




U.S. General Accounting Office. Depot Maintenance: Status of the Navy’s Pearl Harbor 
Pilot Project (GAO/NSIAD-99-199). Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, September 1999, pp. 3-23, 29-33. 
 
U.S. General Accounting Office. Navy Maintenance: Fewer Shipyards May Be Needed 
As Ship Repair Requirements Decline (GAO/NSIAD-93-23). Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, November 1992. 
 
U.S. General Accounting Office. Navy Regional Maintenance: Substantial Opportunities 
Exist to Build on Infrastructure Streamlining Progress (GAO/NSIAD-98-4). 
Washington, 























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 63
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 




4. Professor Jerry McCaffery 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
5. Captain John Mutty, USN (Ret.) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
6. Vice Admiral Thomas Hughes, USN (Ret.) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
7. Professor Joseph San Miguel 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
